













































































                                                1	The	Prague	Brentano	circle,	of	which	many	were	German-speaking	Jews	(e.g.	Kraus,	Utitz,	Bergman),	used	to	meet	after	Marty’s	lectures	in	the	Café	Louvre	to	continue	philosophical	discussions.	There	they	were	sometimes	joined	by	other	intellectual	members	of	the	Prague	German	Jewish	community:	Oskar	Pollack,	Max	Brod	and	Franz	Kafka.		2	Brentano	gave	Kraus	and	Kastil	free	hand	to	organize	and	put	together	the	unpublished	materials	from	his	literary	estate	in	a	way	that	would	correspond	to	his	late	reistic	views.	Reism	and	the	philosophical	theories	contained	in	the	resulting	books	(notably	Brentano	1930,	1933)	are	often	a	result	of	heavy-handed	editing	and	even	rewriting	and	reformulating	of	Brentano’s	texts.	While	it	is	sometimes	hard	to	say	whether	a	position	expressed	in	these	volumes	corresponds	to	Brentano’s	views,	these	books	can	be	safely	read	as	expressing	positions	of	the	Prague	and	Innsbruck	reism	at	the	time	of	their	publications.		3	The	list	of	known	members	of	the	Prague	Brentano	Society	given	by	Binder	(see	Binder	2000:	564)	states	the	following	English	members:	G.E.	Moore,	H.	Eaton,	D.	Hicks,	R.	Reeds.		4	The	reism	of	Brentano	and	his	followers	and	the	reism	of	Tadeusz	Kotarbinski	were	being	developed	independently	until	Twardowski	and	Katkov	made	Kotarbinski	aware	of	the	close	proximity	of	his	views	and	the	views	of	the	late	Brentano	(a	short	description	of	this	development	and	a	comparison	of	both	reistic	views	is	given	in	Kraus	1937:	268-271).	Kotarbinski	was	in	touch	with	Kraus	and	his	pupils	from	1930.	The	ties	between	Prague	and	Lvov	where	strengthened	in	1937	when	on	account	of	Twardowski’s	invitation	Kraus	gave	a	series	of	lectures	in	Poland.	Another	Polish	philosopher,	apart	from	Twardowski,	who	had	ties	to	the	Prague	Brentano	circle	was	Wladislaw	Tatarkiewicz.	Both	Kotarbinski	and	Tatarkiewicz	were	on	the	list	of	the	contributors	for	the	second	volume	of	the	Abhandlungen	zum	Gedächtnis	des	100.	Geburtages	von	Franz	Brentano	that	was	to	be	published	by	the	Prague	Brentano	Society	in	1939.	The	volume	never	saw	the	light	of	day	due	to	the	outbreak	of	the	war.				5	Utitz	wrote	a	book	about	the	psychology	of	life	in	the	Terezín	concentration	camp		which	has	recently	been	republished	together	with	his	shorter	texts	from	the	same	camp	(see	Utitz	2015).			6	The	following	discussions	are	necessarily	selective,	for	the	output	and	the	range	of	topics	of	the	orthodox	Brentanists	was	quite	large.		7	It	would	be	more	proper	to	say	“someone	who	judges”	but	this	makes	the	structure	of	some	further	statements	overly	complicated.			8	Since	conscious	subjects	differentiate	themselves	also	as	“judger”	and	“lovers	and	haters”	the	argument	could	be	extended	to	involve	all	fundamental	classes	of	intentionality.	For	a	more	formalized	version	of	the	Katkovian	perspective	see	Chisholm	1990.	An	a	priori	argument	for	the	grounding	of	intentionality	in	inner	perception	could	be	also	deduced	from	Brentano’s	late	conception	of	time,	which	claims	that	to	be	conscious	of	time	is	to	be	conscious	of	the	time	modes	of	presenting	acts	(see	CHAP.	6),	which	presupposes	self-consciousness.		9	Kraus	confesses	that	the	whole	theory	comes	from	what	he	wrote	down	after	he	read	and	discussed	a	psychognostic	fragment	of	Brentano	during	his	visit	with	Brentano	in	1901	and	that	he	wasn’t	able	to	find	this	view	in	Brentano’s	manuscripts	(Kraus	in	Brentano	1928:	146/1981b:	105).	What	Brentano	discussed	with	Kraus	was	most	likely	inspired	by	Brentano’s	reading	of	Leibniz’	Nouveaux	Essais.	In	his	1908	letter	to	Husserl	Brentano	writes:	“However,	I	saw	that	he	[Leibniz]	in	the	second	book	assumes	an	apperception	of	one’s	own	acts	by	acts	that	occur	later.	And	here	you	find	yourself	in	agreement	with	him,	but	I	don’t”.	Kraus	could	not	have	known	the	letter	since	it	was	published	only	in	1994	(Husserl	1994:	50).		10	“[This	theory	of	apperception]	can	only	be	a	casual	witticism,	not	a	serious	expression	of	belief,	for	otherwise	wherever	the	origins	of	the	concept	of	causality	are	noted	[in	the	works	of	Brentano]	the	case	of	inner	apperception	would	have	to	be	mentioned	as	well....	[F]or	an	immediate	knowledge	of	causality	very	definite	conditions	must	be	fulfilled;	these	conditions	are	fulfilled	only	in	the	case	of	axiomatic	grasping.”	(Rogge	1938:	172).			11	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	works	within	the	confines	of	critical	realism	without	providing	any	serious	“metaphysical”	proof	of	the	existence	of	the	outside	world.	Later,	Brentano	offered	a	proof	of	an	independent	world	or	real	objects	standing	under	causal	laws	(see	Brentano	1925:	118-30,	Kastil	1951:	223-9;	for	critique	see	Rogge	1935:	57-67,	77-87).		
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                                                                                                                                                            12	This	chapter	is	an	outcome	of	the	project	“From	Logical	Objectivism	to	Reism:	Bolzano	and	the	School	of	Brentano”	P401	15-18149S	(Czech	Science	Foundation),	realised	at	the	Institute	of	Philosophy	of	the	Czech	Academy	of	Sciences.	
